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Chapter 7
a room with a view: the monostratal view 
with some room for derivations
Konrad szcześniak
University of silesia in Katowice
This chapter revisits the issue of the status of transformations and underlying levels of 
representation in the description of grammar. Derivational accounts have been rejected 
in recent cognitive models, which replaced them with monostratal constructions, as 
is the case in Construction Grammar (CxG) addressed in most detail here. This study 
reviews three groups of grammatical constructions (argument alternations, question 
structures, and the active-passive pair in a number of slavic languages) and concludes 
that they conceal properties that are not captured by the notion of “construction” alone 
as effectively as they are in derivational analyses that accommodate transformational 
relationships between constructions. Further, I will show that the cognitive arguments 
against transformations do not justify the recent denial of deep structure representations. 
Finally, I will point out that the Construction Grammar approach (at least to the struc-
tures reviewed here) is non-derivational in name only. In reality, the CxG explanatory 
framework employed by authors like Goldberg makes implicit use of derivational logic, 
inevitably involving some operations.
Key words: Construction Grammar, transformations, constructions 
7.1 introduction
The influence of Generative Linguistics has been contested more 
or less vehemently by most cognitive linguists, who disagreed with at 
least some of its main tenets. One scholar who openly declared her 
opposition to Chomsky’s model of grammar was Wierzbicka. What 
she took issue with was the syntactocentric view of language which 
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sought to divorce semantics from grammar. she wrote “Chomskyan 
antisemantic bias is still hanging over linguistics like a dark shadow” 
(Wierzbicka 1996: 7). However, while cognitive revisions of many gen-
erative assumptions are compelling and can be considered important 
contributions to our understanding of how language works, cognitive 
approaches to grammar cast dark shadows of their own. specifically, 
I have in mind the framework of Construction Grammar (CxG) and 
three of its main tenets; the first of which addresses the above-quoted 
antisemantic bias.  
(1) The view of constructions as learned form-meaning pairings: seman-
ticization of grammatical constructions;
(2) The insistence on the arbitrariness of these pairings and its subse-
quent idiosyncrasy;
(3) The monostratal model of constructions: rejection of deep structure.
 While it would be hard to question any of these assumptions in 
principle, for they have been shown to be very effective in describing 
a range of language phenomena (such as the existence of a great num-
ber of more or less productive idiomatic grammatical constructions, 
previously dismissed as “periphery” by Chomsky), I believe that the 
abovementioned CxG ideas should be applied sparingly. Regarding as-
sumption (1), I have argued in various studies, e.g., on the X’s Way Con-
struction (szcześniak 2013) or on the Incredulity Response Construction 
(szcześniak 2014), that the definition of constructions as form-meaning 
pairings should not justify proposing overly rich meanings for schemat-
ic grammatical constructions. Briefly, the recognition that grammatical 
constructions are capable of semantic content (vs. Chomsky’s antise-
mantic bias) does not mean that (especially the more schematic) gram-
matical constructions can be capable of as much semantic content as 
purely lexical items. For reasons of space, I cannot pursue this point 
here any further. Instead, I would like to focus on assumptions (2) and 
(3): the emphasis on the idiosyncratic nature of constructions and the 
all-out rejection of derivations.
7.2 idiosyncrasy 
First, it is helpful to understand the reasons behind the cognitive 
preoccupation with arbitrariness and idiosyncrasy of grammatical con-
structions in constructionist analyses. The emphasis on arbitrariness 
follows from Goldberg’s definition of constructions as “stored pairings 
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of form and function, including morphemes, words, idioms, partially 
lexically filled and fully general linguistic patterns” (Goldberg 2003: 
219, my emphasis). Under this definition, even very schematic construc-
tions, such as the passive, must be learned and memorized, because they 
cannot be derived by application of general principles, i.e., a language 
user cannot “figure them out” or generate them by rule, and therefore 
their form and function (or meaning) are only available by rote. Gold-
berg adds that “any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as 
long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable 
from its component parts or from other constructions recognized to 
exist” (2003: 219). Arbitrariness is also underscored in Traugott and 
Trousdale’s (2013) definition of “constructions” as “typically arbitrary 
associations of form and meaning” (Traugott and Trousdale 2013: 1). 
One could then go as far as to equate arbitrariness and unpredictability 
with idiosyncrasy, as is done by Traugott and Trousdale who observe 
that “[s]ince the arbitrariness of the sign entails idiosyncrasy, idiosyn-
crasy is present in a construction by default” (Traugott and Trousdale 
2013: 11).
It seems then that under CxG analyses, all constructions are by 
default assumed to be idiosyncratic. This approach is especially evident 
and extreme in various studies of the Incredulity Response Construction 
(IRC) exemplified in (4).
(4) a. What? My son? Rob gas stations?
b. Him? Write books? He can’t even read!
For example, Michaelis claims that the construction “owes little or 
nothing to the ordinary English syntax of predication and subordi-
nation” (Michaelis 2010: 169). The idiosyncratic in the IRC is also 
romanced by others who express the following opinions:
The unusual morpho-syntax of accusative subject and bare stem verb 
phrase cannot be accounted for by other existing constructions. (Boas 
2013: 240)
The form of the construction does not obey general rules of English. 
For one thing, there is no verb and yet the expression stands alone 
as a full utterance and conveys an entire proposition. In addition, the 
accusative case marking is normally used for objects, and yet the initial 
NP would seem to act as a subject or topic argument. (Goldberg and 
Casenhiser 2008: 344)
[T]he semantics of the construction as a whole cannot be derived from 
either the semantics of the parts or from their form. This particular 
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semantics of disbelief towards a proposition cannot in any way be 
derived from the fact that there is an oblique argument as a subject, 
a verb in the infinitive, and a complement, e.g., a noun phrase or 
a prepositional phrase. (Barðdal and Eythórsson 2012: 277)
Before we move any further, it should be pointed out that while 
some arbitrariness in at least some constructions is an irrefutable fact, 
and while arbitrariness does indeed make storage necessary, the reverse is 
not necessarily true, i.e., the fact that a given construction is memorized 
does not automatically make it arbitrary. Goldberg herself admits that 
“patterns are also stored if they are sufficiently frequent, even when they 
are fully regular instances of other constructions and thus predictable” 
(Goldberg 2006: 64). It is easy to think, offhand, of countless exam-
ples of such forms. Expressions like best friend, conquer the world – or 
unfinished business (and many other collocations, clichés or proverbs) 
are memorized despite being very low on idiosyncrasy. In this study, 
I will argue that the level of idiosyncrasy has been exaggerated for many 
constructions. Another claim made here is that this idiosyncrasy results 
from the rejection of underlying levels of representation. That is, the 
price of purging a grammar of any reference to derivational mechanisms 
or playing down derivational-style correspondences between construc-
tions is that many constructions by force appear more idiosyncratic (and 
complicated) than they really are.
7.3 a cognitive case against derivations
One of the hallmarks of many cognitive models, including Construc-
tion Grammar, which I review in more detail here, is the monostratal 
view of grammar. Under this view, sentences no longer need to be 
derived from underlying levels of representation. That is, no transforma-
tions are allowed under CxG analyses. Instead, the form of a sentence 
depends on what constructions appear in it. This is a radical departure 
from the belief that sentences have predefined forms (a limited num-
ber of sentence types arrived at through transformations). According to 
CxG analyses, a sentence can, for example, be shaped by the lexical 
properties of verbs, an assumption reminiscent of the Projection Princi-
ple, the difference being that in CxG, verbs and all other lexical items 
are considered “constructions” on a par with more schematic struc-
tures (also “constructions”) such as the Intransitive Construction, or 
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the Time-Away Construction, which also affect the form of a sentence 
themselves, as in these examples:
(5) a. I’m dancing in the rain. (The Intransitive Construction)
b. Dance me to the end of love. (The Caused Motion Construction)
c. We danced the night away. (The Time-Away Construction)
d. What? Him, dance? (The Incredulity Response Construction)
e. She danced her way into my heart. (The X’s Way Construction)
f. They danced themselves out of breath. (The Resultative Construction)
It is important to stress here that in recent cognitive models of 
grammar, derivations are shunned at all cost, with an almost ideolog-
ical fervor. One of the most influential figures representing the CxG 
framework, Goldberg avows her approval of theoretical approaches 
that “eschew the need for any kind of transformation or derivation” 
(2002: 327). she and other proponents of CxG analyses underscore 
the non-derivational character of constructions and they rule out the 
possibility of any derivational-style relationships between even those 
grammatical patterns that quite intuitively seem to be related. some 
examples of this approach are discussed in the following sections.
7.3.1 Alternations
It is in this spirit that Goldberg (2002) reviews a number of phe-
nomena, such as the locative alternation, and argues that what used to 
be treated as its two related realizations, such as the uses Pat loaded the 
wagon with the hay and Pat loaded the hay onto the wagon (in Goldberg 
2000: examples 40–41), are in fact two separate constructions that do 
not share any common derivational origin. Goldberg (2002) express-
es the view that “it is profitable to look beyond alternations and to 
consider each surface pattern on its own terms” (327). she also looks 
at the ditransitive alternation and explains that instead of viewing the 
pattern Mina sent Mel a book as a derivation from Mina sent a book 
to Mel, one should focus on finding generalizations applying to each 
surface pattern. she writes,
A compelling reason to avoid positing derivations in favor of an em-
phasis on surface form is simply that there are typically powerful ge-
neralizations surrounding particular surface forms that are more broad 
than those captured by derivations or transformations. We refer to 
these broader generalizations as surface generalizations. (327, original 
emphasis)
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By “surface generalizations”, she means descriptions of semantic and 
formal properties of each surface pattern without reference to its close 
paraphrase. Thus, the ditransitive pattern exemplified in (6a) below 
should be considered in isolation from the prepositional alternant (6b).
(6) a. Chloe sold/showed/threw Chase a book. (Ditransitive)
b. Chloe sold/showed/threw a book to Chase. (Prepositional)
Goldberg shows that each pattern displays its own characteristics 
and differs considerably from its paraphrase. This is a logical outgrowth 
of Goldberg’s view of constructions, which she defines as “learned 
pairings of form and meaning”. Thus, knowledge of a construction in-
volves understanding how a particular form is paired with its meaning 
and it does not require associating it with other purportedly related 
patterns. In what concerns formal properties, all that a speaker needs 
to know is a construction’s surface form, not its alleged derivational 
origin.
In the case of the locative alternation, one argument against a der-
ivational link that Goldberg offers is that there is an important seman-
tic difference between the two uses: in Pat loaded the wagon with hay, 
the wagon is more affected (it is loaded fully, while some hay may be 
left), while in Pat loaded the hay onto the wagon, it is the hay that is 
affected (all of it is loaded onto the wagon, while there may still be 
extra room on the wagon).
There is little point questioning this and other undoubtedly accu-
rate observations offered by Goldberg (nor is there room to enumerate 
them all here) and I am not aware of any advocates of alternation 
links between patterns (Pinker 1989; Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2008) 
who would deny the pattern-specific properties or claim that the two 
forms are synonymous. Bringing up peculiarities of each pattern cannot 
serve as an argument against entertaining alternation-style links be-
tween them. If anything, Goldberg merely provides an argument against 
meaning-preserving transformations, a view not held by proponents of 
alternations.
Very similar arguments against a derivational relationship between 
two corresponding forms are offered by Gries (2003). In his analysis 
of verb particle placement (throw out the garbage vs. throw the garbage 
out), Gries insists that the two patterns should be considered separately 
as independent unrelated constructions. He writes, “each construction 
constitutes a category in its own right”. And again, like Goldberg, Gries 
claims that there are more “differences than similarities between the 
two constructions” (Gries 2003: 141).
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What the two authors do not address is the fact that the cases 
of alternations they focus on are only a fraction of a large group of 
phenomena involving constituents that can, under some circumstances, 
swap positions. In the following examples, the direct object (a) can, for 
reasons of syntactic weight and/or information structure, change places 
with the prepositional object (b) more or less regardless of the status 
of the latter: the swap is possible when the prepositional phrase is an 
adjunct (7a, 7b), when it is a complement of the verb (7c), and when 
it is part of a fixed expression, as in the case of take into consideration 
or bear in mind (7d, 7e).
(7) a. Never put off [what can be done today]a [till tomorrow]b.
Never put off [till tomorrow]b [what can be done today]a.
b. I would like to introduce [the next president of the United states]a
[to you]b.
I would like to introduce [to you]b [the next president of the United
states]a.
c. Put [all relishes]a [on the table]b.
Put [on the table]b [all relishes]a.
d. We failed to take [unforeseen circumstances]a [into consideration]b.
We failed to take [into consideration]b [unforeseen circumstances]a.
e. Bear [the consequences of your decisions]a [in mind]b.
Bear [in mind]b [the consequences of your decisions]a.
While it is in theory possible to single out a few cases of patterns like 
verb particle constructions and the locative alternation, divide them into 
two subconstructions and propose separate “surface generalizations” for 
them, doing so for a potentially enormous number of constructions 
that undergo the transposition would mean multiplying constructions 
practically ad infinitum. Each fixed expression such as bear in mind, 
keep in view, have in mind, or bring to an end, etc. would have to be 
realized as two separate constructions [bear Obj in mind] and [bear in 
mind Obj], each with its own surface generalizations. The problem here 
is not only that of storage challenges (as each expression would have to 
be represented twice, using up double the normal amount of the lexi-
con resources). Treating expressions as two unrelated constructions also 
presupposes the existence of reverse-order variants which a speaker may 
never have attested but is capable of using. For example, the expression 
cut down to size appears in object-first form [cut Obj down to size] with 
a lot greater frequency than in object-last form [cut down to size Obj]. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that at least some speakers may 
have never come across the latter form and therefore do not store it in 
the lexicon. Yet, it would be far-fetched to propose that they would be 
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unable to use it in the latter variant as in example (8b) below. Whoever 
used the expression in the variant exemplified in (8b) generated it by 
a rule that changes the positions of constituents.
(8) a. We may cut him down to size, if need be.
b. (…) to cut down to size the European Commission’s role as Guardian
of the Treaties.
7.3.2 Questions
similarly, what used to be “Exhibit A” held up by generative gram-
marians as an example of a structure formed through transformations, 
questions too are now argued to be constructions without any deriva-
tional history. Goldberg proposes that questions like What did Liza buy 
Zach? can be assembled without invoking transformations. Instead, all 
that is needed is a “combination of constructions”. she insists that the 
form of a question-type sentence 
is determined by a combination of a verb phrase construction with 
the Question construction, the latter of which allows for the ‘‘theme’’ 
argument (represented by What) to appear sentence-initially. No un-
derlying levels of syntax, nor any phonologically empty elements are 
posited. (Goldberg 2006: 10)
One conspicuous property of questions is that they involve inversion, 
a decidedly transformation-style operation. Goldberg skirts this problem 
by calling inversion a construction (“subject-Auxiliary Inversion Con-
struction”, 10). Leaving aside a rather counterintuitive conception of in-
version as a form (and not a process), Goldberg avoids the inconvenient 
fact that the assembly of a sentence through a combination of construc-
tions is itself a process which must take place in a succession of steps. 
Given that the assembly of a question requires the combination of 
various constructions, one may entertain the possibility that the con-
structions in question are combined in a specific order, rather than all 
at once. Among “constructions” involved in the formation of a ques-
tion-type sentence are the replacement of the argument for a wh-word 
and the inversion construction. It stands to reason that they do not 
occur at the same time and that replacement occurs before inversion, 
given that the latter need not be implemented at all (e.g., in indirect 
questions). If that is indeed the case, one should ask a more funda-
mental question, namely: How does that combination of constructions 
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in the assembly of a sentence differ from a transformational process? It 
seems that some constructions (such as the inversion construction) are 
used as new labels for what should more accurately be referred to as 
a “process” or “operation”. Further, the application of inversion, even 
if it is accurate to call it a construction, in combination with other 
constructions is an operational sequence. 
Questions and inversion are also a good example illustrating that 
the price for analyzing all surface forms only in terms of learned con-
structions (without invoking transformations) is unchecked idiosyncrasy. 
While (in precognitive models) variation on form could be accounted 
for by reference to movement transformations, now surface variants 
have to be given separate dedicated constructions, which do not explain 
some interesting consequences of the derivational procedures involved in 
the formation of questions. In example (9), as Anderson and Lightfoot 
(2002) explain, the different original locations of the wh-argument are 
responsible for when want to may be reduced to wanna. That is, the 
reduction is possible in (9a), but not in (9b), because in the latter want 
and to are separated by the trace left by the wh-argument. Without in-
voking movement and a trace it involves, the possibility of using wanna 
in (9a) and its impossibility in (9b) would have to be stipulated as an 
idiosyncratic detail that the speaker needs to memorize. Allowing room 
for movement in the analysis makes such consequences much less idi-
osyncratic and mysterious.
(9) a. Whoxdo you want [IP Ito see x]?
b. Whoxdo you want [IP x Ito go]? (example (9.1) in Anderson and 
Lightfoot 2002: 187)
7.3.3 The passive 
Another example of a grammatical pattern that generative analyses 
treated as a product of a derivational process is the passive. Contrary to 
this view, Hilpert (2014) claims that it is “difficult to maintain the idea 
of a grammatical rule that systematically links both constructions”, and 
he goes on to stipulate that “the Passive is a construction in its own 
right, a generalisation that speakers have to learn as an independent 
unit of grammatical knowledge” (42). 
Hilpert (2014) reviews the properties identified in Huddleston and 
Pullum (2002) to make a case for treating the passive as an independent 
construction. He observes that “it is a tempting idea to think of the 
Passive as a grammatical rule that takes a transitive Active sentence as 
131Chapter 7. A room with a view: The monostratal view with some room…
its input and yields a passivized counterpart” (40, original small caps). 
However, he claims that a considerable number of important differ-
ences between them makes it clear that a simple general derivational 
rule cannot yield passive sentences out of active ones. For example, he 
looks at passive sentences built around prepositional verbs, showing 
that while many are perfectly natural and acceptable forms, others 
are clearly not.
(10) a. Sally’s papers are referred to a lot.
b. *The children are looked to a lot.
 
Hilpert concludes that “the difference between refer and look is diffi-
cult to explain with recourse to a general grammatical rule”, the solution 
being to view the passive as a construction with “distinct collocational 
preferences”. According to Hilpert, prepositional passives sound natural 
with entrenched or idiomatic combinations of verbs and their objects. 
“Hence, approve of a plan, pay for everything, or deal with issues are 
good candidates for prepositional passives, whereas search under a bed, 
walk across a hallway, or choose between two theories yield questionable 
examples”1 (41).
To bolster his case for the passive as an independent construction, he 
also turns to verbs that only appear in the passive voice. The following 
examples do not have any evident active variants. 
 
(11) a. Pat is reputed to be very rich.
b. It is rumoured that there will be an election before the end of the 
 year. (examples (1–2) in Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1435)
 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002) express this fact in terms that leave 
little doubt; they say “[t]he verbs repute and rumour are wholly restrict-
ed to the passive – and are thus morphologically defective, having only 
a past participle form” (1435). Examples such as these make it quite 
clear that the passive cannot be derived from an active source, since it 
does not even exist.
1 This proposal is not very convincing. The entrenchment or idiomaticity of the 
verb-prepositional-object combinations does not explain why some fairly unidiomatic 
combinations are nevertheless still acceptable candidates for prepositional passives. 
(i) Fly under the bridge (cf. The bridge was flown under.)
While on the other hand, some very idiomatic combinations fail to yield natu-
ral-sounding passives:
(ii) Fly under the radar (cf. *This radar was flown under.)
Unless it is a way of saying that many pilots managed to go undetected and thus 
showed a given radar device to be defective or inefficient.
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As with Goldberg’s arguments for treating alternation variants 
separately on the grounds that they are too different, here also, the link 
between the active and passive is being refuted by reasoning that the 
two constructions are too different to be related. Again, like in the case 
of alternations mentioned above, no proponents of a derivational link 
would argue that the two patterns are identical.
Interesting evidence in favor of a derivational link between the two 
patterns comes from slavic languages, where the object is marked overt-
ly for case. One striking characteristic is that objects marked for cases 
other than the accusative do not undergo passivization:
(12) a. Opiekuję się bratem.
 Baby-sit-1sg się-refl brother-instr
 ‘I am baby-sitting my brother’.
b. *Brat jest opiekowany przeze mnie.
 Brother is baby-sat-part by me.
 ‘My brother is being baby-sat by me’.
(13) a. Politycy podlizują się wyborcom.
 Politicians flatter się-refl voters-dat
 ‘Politicians flatter voters’.
b. *Wyborcy są podlizywani.
 Voters are flattered-part
 ‘Voters are being flattered’.
(14) a. Tomek obawiał się gniewu nauczyciela. 
 Tom feared się-refl wrath-gen teacher-gen
 ‘Tom feared the teacher’s wrath’.
b. *Gniew nauczyciela był obawiany.
 Fear teacher-gen was feared-part
 ‘The teacher’s wrath was feared’.
similarly in Czech, if the object is in a case other than the Accusa-
tive, it does not appear as the subject in a passive sentence.
(15) a. Zbavil jsem se řas v akváriu.
 Rid-1sg be-aux se-refl algae-gen in fishtank.
 ‘I got rid of algae in the fishtank’.
b. *Řasy v akváriu byly zbavěny.
 Algae in fishtank were rid-part
 ‘Algae in the fishtank have been gotten rid of’.
(16) a. Odstranil jsem řasy v akváriu.
 Removed-1sg be-aux algae-acc in fishtank.
 ‘I have removed algea in the fishtank’.
 Řasy v akváriu byly odstraněny.
 Algae in fishtank were removed-part
  ‘Algae in the fishtank have been removed’.
133Chapter 7. A room with a view: The monostratal view with some room…
In Ukrainian2 too, passives do not form out of objects marked for 
non-accusative cases.
(17) a. я прислухуюсь музиці. (Ya prisluhuyus’ muzitsi.)
 I listen-1sg.refl music-dat
 ‘I am listening to music’.
b. *музика є прислухована. (*Muzika ye prisluhovana.)
 Music is listened-part  
 ‘Music is being listened to’.
The first impression is that the passive in these three slavic languages 
depends on the case of the object in the active voice. It is as if the active 
voice construction is consulted each time the passive is formed. This is 
not to say that the passive is derived out of the active form, but rather 
that the formation of a passive structure relies on some reference to the 
case of the object whether that case is read off the lexical properties of 
the verb or the active form of a sentence.
What the above examples have in common is that they all involve 
reflexive verbs. Critics of the derivational view could argue that the 
passive construction simply disallows reflexive verbs; then no reference 
to the active pattern would be necessary. However, the same constraints 
apply to non-reflexive verbs that take objects marked for cases other 
than accusative:
(18) a. Sędzia uwierzył świadkowi.
 Judge believed witness-dat
 ‘The judge believed the witness’.
b. *Świadek był uwierzony.
 Witness was believed-part
 ‘The witness was believed’.
(19) a. Мій лікар порадивме нікинути палити. (Miy likar poradivmye nikinuti paliti.)
 My doctor advised me quitting smoking.
 ‘My doctor advised me-dat to quit smoking’.
b. *Я був порадений кинути палити. (Ya buv poradyeniy kynuty palety.)
 I was advised  quitting smoking.
 ‘I was advised to quit smoking’.
some cognate verbs take different cases in Polish and Czech. For ex-
ample, the verb rozumieć (‘understand’) requires the accusative in Polish, 
2 Examples provided by Monika Hałaś.
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while its Czech cognate rozumět takes dative objects. Consequently, the 
Polish verb can appear in both the active and passive voice.
(20) a. Detektyw zrozumiał obcokrajowców.
 Detective understood foreigners-acc
 ‘The detective understood the foreigners’.
b. Obcokrajowcy zostali zrozumiani.
 Foreigners were understood-part
 ‘The foreigners were understood’.
In Czech, where the same verb takes the dative case, the passive is 
impossible.
(21) a. Detektiv rozuměl cizincům.
 Detective understood foreigners-dat
 ‘The detective understood the foreigners’.
b. *Cizinci byli rozuměni.
 Foreigners were understood-part
 ‘The foreigners were understood’.
It should be stressed that the passive is blocked if the case of the 
verb is other than accusative, it is not blocked by the meaning of the 
verb. If a synonym is used which takes accusative objects, the passive 
is perfectly natural:
(22) a. Detektiv pochopil cizince.
 Detective understood foreigners-acc
 ‘The detective understood the foreigners’.
b. Cizinci byli pochopeni.
 Foreigners were understood-part
 ‘The foreigners were understood’.
Does all this mean that the passive voice is derived from the active? 
Most likely not. If it were, and if the derivation occurred on the surface 
form, some passives should theoretically not be possible. For example, 
in Polish and a number of other slavic languages, verbs in negative 
form take genitive objects (genitive of negation). Because the passive 
voice does not form when the object of the active voice is other than 
accusative, the passive in (24b) should not be grammatical. In reality, 
it is perfectly well-formed, probably because if it does take the active 
as its input, it does so before the negation changes the accusative case 
into the genitive in (24a).
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(23) a. Biolodzy widzieli takie zwierzęta.
 Biologists see-past such-acc animals-acc
 ‘Biologists have seen such animals’.
b. Takie zwierzęta były widziane przez biologów. 
 such animals be-past seen-part by biologists.
 ‘such animals have been seen by biologists’.
(24) a. Biolodzy nie widzieli takich zwierząt.
 Biologists not see-past such-gen animals-gen
 ‘Biologists have not seen such animals’.
b. Takie zwierzęta nie były widziane przez biologów. 
 such animals not be-past seen-part by biologists.
 ‘such animals have not been seen by biologists’.
The examples I have presented so far should make it clear that while 
classic generative-style derivations are untenable, a purely monostratal 
architecture of grammar is not entirely accurate either. The cases I have 
reviewed involved structures with two corresponding subvariants: alter-
nations with two patterns, questions echoing declarative structures, and 
finally passive sentences whose links with active sentences are being 
dismissed in CxG analyses. Even if each member of these pairs is an 
independent construction, the corresponding patterns share too much of 
their surface forms to rule out any links between them, claiming that 
each member is derived completely independently. The combinations 
proposed by Goldberg are non-derivations only in theory. In practice, 
they are merely labels for what is really a host of derivational-style pro-
cesses. Next, I review reasons behind the general cognitive aversion to 
derivations, reasons which upon further reflection do not pose a serious 
problem to underlying levels of representation. 
7.4 alleged reasons against derivations 
Two important reasons have been offered to justify the construc-
tion grammarian and – more generally – cognitive linguistic skepticism 
toward generative derivations. One is the perceived implausibility of 
hidden levels of representation being part of the innate language faculty. 
For example, in their discussion of derivational rules responsible for the 
movement of verb particles (take out the garbage vs. take the garbage 
out) Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) write:
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We find it unlikely that these variants are realizations of different 
abstract parameter settings, where the parameters are of sufficient ge-
nerality to belong in an innate language capacity (and to be coded 
on the genome and selected for by evolution!). (38)
similarly, Kay advocates for a monostratal model of grammar through 
the following reasoning:
Positing a monotonic and declarative grammar of constructions – as 
against, for example, the rich architecture of GB – encourages substi-
tuting for the dramatic claim that human infants are endowed innately 
with extensive knowledge of linguistic structure the more cautious hypo-
thesis that human infants are endowed innately with a special ability 
to induce linguistic structures from linguistic data, that is, to acquire 
linguistic constructions. (Kay 1995: 173)
Another reason why transformations have been viewed with suspi-
cion is that they are assumed to be a necessarily temporal process. It is 
scarcely to be imagined that each time a sentence is produced, a speaker 
proceeds from an underlying deep structure, through a convoluted series 
of derivational steps, to the final surface structure that is pronounced. 
This extreme and banal view is a caricature of transformations, dis-
missed early on in the development of generative linguistics. Gazzaniga 
(1973) reports on research aiming to demonstrate that transformations 
take real time and admits that although it “provided psychological ev-
idence that a transformation process was involved”, the results of the 
study are “hardly definitive” (111).
As Ott (2010) explains, “successive steps in I-language derivations do 
not imply any temporal order; derivations are nothing but a formal way 
of characterizing the speaker-hearer’s knowledge” (90). He goes on to ac-
knowledge that it is “impossible to grasp this conception of I-language 
in any intuitive way” (90). It is indeed counterintuitive to conceive of 
transformations atemporally, probably because we think of transformations 
metaphorically as temporal chains of steps. However, the difficulty of im-
agining transformations outside of real time arises only when the “trans-
formations as a chain of steps” metaphor is taken literally. This point was 
illustrated by Piaget (2015 [1970]) who argued that “a transformation need 
not be a temporal process: 1+1 ‘make’ 2; 3 ‘follows hard on’ 2; clearly, the 
‘making’ and ‘following’ here meant are not temporal processes” (11–12). 
In other words, transformations should be understood as an expression of 
a relationship between structures as if things changed positions.
These two arguments against transformations – the implausibility of 
underlying structures being coded innately and the apparent contradic-
137Chapter 7. A room with a view: The monostratal view with some room…
tion in terms of a temporal derivational steps – do not justify embracing 
a monostratal organization of grammar. First, as the above discussion 
should have made clear, transformations do not have to involve a chron-
ological progression of complicated steps. Transformations should more 
accurately be construed as relations between structures, and not literally 
chronological assembly processes. The second argument – the unlikely 
genetic coding of abstract linguistic principles associated with underly-
ing levels – involves a logical fallacy of false alternatives, also known as 
the black-and-white fallacy. This error of reasoning involves arguing that 
if one alternative is wrong (here, the existence of deep structure levels of 
representation), its opposite (a monostratal organization) must be true. 
As a result, under an extreme application of this view, intuitively related 
structures, such as the passive and active constructions, are treated as 
completely separate entities bearing no association to each other. Even 
if a derivational view turns out to be wrong, there is of course a third 
option, one where the two structures are related through shared features 
(e.g., close synonymy) or by being more concrete realizations of a more 
general, abstract construction.
7.5 Conclusions
Hedging their anti-generative approach, Goldberg (2002) and Hilpert 
(2014) do concede that correspondences between forms play a role in 
the speaker’s knowledge of grammar. Goldberg stresses that her argu-
ments “should not be taken to imply that possible paraphrase relations 
play no role in the learning, processing or representation of language” 
(2002: 349), and Hilpert admits that “speakers will be aware that the 
two constructions correspond in important ways, that they often para-
phrase one another, and that they express similar states of affairs” (42). 
However, they insist that whatever the correspondences between two 
constructions, they have to be learned separately as “independent units 
of grammatical knowledge”.
While I am skeptical of this all-out anti-generative approach, I am 
not adopting an all-out anti-constructionist approach as an alternative. 
The arguments in this study should not be taken as a case for a re-
turn to transformations. There are sufficient grounds for accounting for 
a great number of constructions without recourse to derivational meas-
ures. It would be counterproductive and indeed impossible to attempt 
to transformationally arrive at the richness of detail and individual vari-
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ation evinced by many constructions, such as those in examples (5b–5f) 
(and of course, no attempts to this effect have been made in generative 
analyses, which dismissed such uses as “periphery”). But among the 
idiosyncratic richness and irregular miscellany, there do exist sizeable 
pockets of regular structures. Assembling them through construction-
al surface generalizations is as impracticable and counterproductive as 
transformational derivations of periphery-type structures written off in 
generative studies.
That is, under a strict constructionist view, the slightest variation 
in word order in a given structure would make it necessary to postu-
late a new, independent construction, the way Gries (2003) does it 
for verb particle constructions. Taken to the extreme, this would mean 
multiplying constructions ad infinitum for each newly-attested surface 
configuration of a structure. Goldberg relaxes this approach by stipu-
lating that “‘surface form’ need not specify a particular word order” 
(2006: 10). In other words, surface generalizations do not have to be 
exact, rigid templates for how constructions should be formed; at least 
some of them are underspecified. This raises a problem, though. Given 
that even the most rigid phrasal constructions (e.g., kick the bucket) allow 
at least some variation in word order (e.g., kick the proverbial bucket), 
one should assume that most, if not all, constructions are underspeci-
fied at least to some degree. The problem here is that if they are indeed 
underspecified, they also have to carry constraints on what word orders 
are not allowed, and this is tantamount to equipping constructions with 
generative-style derivational instructions on what variations will yield 
well-formed structures.
I believe it would be beneficial to reconcile the constructionist view 
of grammar (complete with its detailed specifications of surface forms) 
with some transformations to account for at least those phenomena 
that are sufficiently regular and frequent to recur across various con-
structions (e.g., inversion, deletion). such a mixed architecture should 
also allow for some constructions to share part of their derivational 
history, as there is no point deriving completely independently two 
constructions that share almost all their make-up (like the verb particle 
constructions). To attempt such relentlessly separate treatment is about 
as sound as insisting that two closely related species, such as chimps 
and bonobos, should only be regarded separately, as if they evolved 
completely independently. The point is that two very similar construc-
tions cannot be similar by coincidence; what they share is a result of 
a common derivational origin or relationship. 
Admittedly, making room for derivations may seem like an unwel-
come, inelegant compromise disrupting a harmonious, purely monos-
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tratal system. But the fact of the matter is that the system, as cham-
pioned by its main proponents, is not harmonious. The determinedly 
anti-derivational nomenclature notwithstanding, the CxG monostratal 
architecture features sequential operations, which presuppose underlying 
structures of some form or other. The fact that a sentence is assembled 
through a “combination of constructions” means that the construc-
tions in question are first available in isolation and they come togeth-
er through a certain unification algorithm, most likely one involving 
steps taken in a specific sequence rather than occurring haphazardly, 
as I argued above in section 7.3.2. Combination is just another name 
for derivation.
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